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I. INTRODUCTION
The past dozen or so years have seen the public image of the
European Community (EC)-now the European Union
(EU)'--transformed from that of a customs union with grand ambi-
tions to a central actor on the global stage. This apparently sudden
rise to prominence resulted from the confluence of the extended
internal development of the EU-symbolized by the Single European
Act's (SEA) "1992" initiative 2 -and the radical change in Western
Europe's external environment brought about by the end of the cold
war.3 In the realms of both high and low politics, from the fate of
the Bosnian Muslims to the fate of Camembert cheese,4 the EU is
* A.B. 1990, University of Michigan; M.AJJ.D. 1994, Yale University.
1. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION [EU TREATY]. The EU TREATY introduced the term
"European Union." EU TREATY, tit. 1, art. A. The European Union has historically been
referred to as the European Community. General descriptive terms now designate the
organization the "European Union," "Union," or "EU." However, the terms "European
Community," "Community," or "EC" are retained where appropriate.
2. Single European Act, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1, as revised in 1987 OJ. (L 304) 46. See gen-
erally Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The "1992 Project". Stages, Structures, Results and Prospects, 11
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1097 (1990) (detailing the history and development of the SEA); Andrew
Moravcsik, Negotiating the Single European Ac4 in THE NEw EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:
DEClSiONMAKING AND INSTITUnONAL CHANGE [hereinafter THE NEW EC] 41 (Robert 0.
Keohane & Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1991) (analyzing the history of the SEA and its present
success).
3. The collapse of the East-West confrontation not only decreased external threats to the
Community; it also increased pressure on the EC member states to act more cohesively in order
to fill the leadership void. See Finn Laursen, Explaining the Intergovernmental Conference on
Political Union, in THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL UNION:
INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS, NEW POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 229,240-41 (Finn Laursen & Sophie Vanhoonacker eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE
IGC ON POLITICAL UNION].
4. See Noel Malcolm, Is There a Doctor in the House?: The EC's Fantasies of
Superpowerdom have had Consequences that are all too Real, NAT'L REV., July 5, 1992, at 39;
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now the relevant forum for many of the most important decisions
shaping the lives of Europeans.
But by what right have the institutions of the EU assumed such
power? Many analysts discuss a "democratic deficit" in the Union, a
deficit created by the allocation of more and more functions to the
existing Union organs without a corresponding strengthening of in-
stitutions to provide democratic oversight.5 The concern these writers
express is genuine, and their attempts to address it are made in good
faith. The difficulty, though, is that the solutions currently being
proposed do not reach to the root of the problem.6
The European Parliament has been directly elected by the
citizens of the member states since 1979. It has thus been the
natural focus of efforts to democratize the EU. One apparently
simple solution to the EU's problems of democratic legitimacy is to
reform its internal workings to give the democratically elected
European Parliament more power.' The Union's problems, though,
are more basic than the reformers realize. The democratic deficit is
less a question of formal accountability than of the legitimacy of the
EU as a new supranational polity, and as such it will not be amenable
to the technocratic quick fix. Only a fundamental political mobiliza-
tion and transformation will create the sense of dual citizenship the
European Union needs to truly legitimate its power.
This Article argues that constitutionalism provides the best means
for legitimizing the EU in the eyes of Europe's people. As Part II
illustrates, the gap between popular acceptance of the EU and the
functioning of Union governance is not easily bridged by altering the
formal configuration of the Union's governing organs. Uneasiness
with the EU runs deeper than its organizational chart; the Union may
Runny, Smelly, and Safe, ECONOMIST, June 27, 1992, at 60.
5. See EUROPOLITICS: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICYMAKING IN THE "NEW" EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 277-78 (Alberta M. Sbragia ed., 1992) [hereinafter EUROPOLITICS]; MARTIN
HOLLAND, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INTEGRATION 85-87 (1993); SIMON SERFATY, TAKING
EUROPE SERIOUSLY 158-64 (1992); Finn Laursen, The Maastricht Treaty: A Critical Evaluation,
in THE IGC ON POLITICAL UNION, supra note 3, at 249, 249-52; Joseph H.H. Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.. 2403, 2466-74 (1991); Shirley Williams, Sovereignty
and Accountability in the European Community, in THE NEW EC, supra note 2, at 155, 162-72.
6. See discussion infra part IV.
7. The Treaty of Rome made provisions for the direct election of the European
Parliament. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EC TREATY]
art. 138. However, an implementing decision was not taken until 1976. Council Decision 76/787,
1976 O.J. (L 278) 5. For an overview of the European Parliament's structure, history, and
duties, see FRANCIS JACOBS ET AL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2d ed. 1992).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 32-35.
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only gain legitimacy by fundamental adjustments. Part III describes
the characteristics of legitimacy, noting that a government's legitimacy
depends not so much on formal structures as on a popular belief that
those structures properly serve the citizenry. Thus, as Part IV
explains, of utmost concern to European integrationists is the
fundamental question of whether the EU is a legitimate polity.
Constitutionalism, providing an opportunity for popular discourse
on fundamental concerns of government, is the best means to
legitimate governing authority. Part V describes the process by which
citizens construct fundamental laws. The present EU treaties, lacking
the characteristics of fundamental law, cannot legitimate the EU's
governing structure in the eyes of the people of Europe. As the
present time manifests a unique opportunity to construct a new
Union, a federal constitutional structure is the best hope for legitimiz-
ing an integrated Europe.
II. THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT
The EU's development has been marked by a great expansion of
its powers over time.9 The debate over the reasons for these changes
is far from settled," but there is little doubt about the result: more
decisions are being taken by Union institutions that were once taken
by national governments alone." The problem is that those institu-
tions were designed with the politicians of Europe rather than the
peoples of Europe in mind.
A. The Traditional View
Jean Monnet is widely regarded as the symbolic father and single
most influential architect of the European Community. 2 Monnet's
conception of the EC was unabashedly elitist, as befitted someone
9. For an excellent account of the historical development of the European Community,
see Weiler, supra note 5.
10. Among the better recent attempts at analyzing the development of the EC are
EUROPOLITICS, supra note 5 and THE NEW EC, supra note 2.
11. See Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley Hoffmann, Institutional Change in Europe in the
1980's, in THE NEW EC, supra note 2, at 1-3. The 1992 initiative associated with the SEA, for
example, required harmonization of national laws in hundreds of areas. Completing the Internal
Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM(85)310 final
[hereinafter White Paper]; Single European Act art. 8A and Declaration.
12. See MICHAEL BURGESS, FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN UNION: POLITICAL IDEAS,
INFLUENCES AND STRATEGIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1972-1987, at 55-59 (1989);
DEREK W. URWIN, THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
SINCE 1945, at 172 (1991).
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whose influence was rooted in his access to European leaders.1 3 In
his vision, far-sighted European statesmen were gradually to build an
ever-thicker web of pan-European institutions, and public support
would naturally follow at some point in the future. Indeed, Monnet
saw public participation in the early stages of Community develop-
ment as an evil to be avoided. 4 It was only after European leaders
had gently guided the people into a de facto new Europe that popular
opinion could be trusted: "I thought it wrong to consult the peoples
of Europe about the structure of a Community of which they had no
practical experience."1"
Monnet's elite-driven vision, while successful in creating a
European Community with meaningful powers, has drawn increasing
criticism." Precisely because Community institutions have slowly
grown in power, many are troubled by the exclusion of the peoples of
Europe." Monnet's pragmatism has started to look more like
paternalism, and there is a growing sense that the EU does not fully
live up to the democratic ideals of Europe. The turmoil surrounding
the Maastricht Treaty is but the latest expression of this trend; 8
Denmark, whose voters initially rejected the treaty, has traditionally
been among the most skeptical of the legitimacy of decisions taken in
Brussels."
13. See HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 8-13. Monnet's long and unusual career included several
posts of some importance in French and international bureaucracies, but his overarching
influence on European affairs was exerted largely beyond the bounds of his formal positions.
For an account of Monnet's life, see JEAN MONNET THE PATH TO EUROPEAN UNITY (Douglas
Brinkley & Clifford Hackett eds., 1991).
14. BURGESS, supra note 12, at 46-48, 54.
15. Id. at 54 (quoting Jean Monnet).
16. Id. at 55-60 (After the creation of the Community, "the political centre... remained
weak and impotent, lacking the capacity to go beyond what existed and unable to adapt to new
forces and problems encountered at a European level."). Id. at 58.
17. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 5, at 169 ("Strasbourg is inaccessible to Greek peasants,
Portuguese fishermen, Spanish factory workers, and Scottish bank clerks.., without citizen
participation, Citizens' Europe languishes. For all the high-pressure public relations on Europe
1992, the man and woman in the European street feel uninvolved.").
18. See DAVID ARTER, THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 212-16 (1993); WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, BUILDING A NEW EUROPE: THE
CHALLENGE OF SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION AND SYSTEMIC REFORM 122-23 (1992).
19. The Danish Parliament, for example, maintains closer control over its government's
positions in EC institutions than do the parliaments of other states; EC debates and referenda
are also a prominent feature of national politics. See Finn Laursen, Denmark and European
Political Union, in THE IGC ON POLITICAL UNION, supra note 3, at 63, 63-70; Williams, supra
note 5, at 159-60.
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The vague sense of unease about the democratic foundations of
the Union has traditionally been analyzed in terms of the EC's formal
structure. The most frequent targets of criticism are the two most
powerful organs of the Union, the European Commission (Commis-
sion) and the Council of the European Union (Council). The
Commission is the backbone of the Brussels bureaucracy; it has wide
ranging executive responsibilities in the supervision and implementa-
tion of community activities and is the source of new proposals for
Union action."° The Council is the primary decision-making body,
and as such, exerts considerable influence over the other organs, espe-
cially in developing policy.2' Criticism of the Commission is rather
straightforward.2 That body is not elected, but rather appointed to
fixed terms by common accord of the member states.3 Once
appointed, Commissioners are essentially unaccountable.24 The
Commission can be removed en banc by the European Parliament,
but disciplining individual Commissioners is not possible.' The
European Parliament has never used the power to remove the
Commission as a whole and, dependent on the EU for such power as
it does have, is unlikely ever to create an institution-threatening crisis
by firing the entire executive organ of the Union.26
While the Commission is still influential, its power has been
checked by the Council, the organ made up of ministers from the
member state governments. The Council provides a means whereby
national governments can oversee Union decision making. Such
intergovernmental oversight and control of Union action has increased
in direct proportion to the power allocated to the Union.27 The
development of intergovernmental checks on Union authority,
however, does not satisfy those who criticize the Union's democratic
shortfall. Decisions of the Council are made by government ministers
20. See B. Guy Peters, Bureaucratic Politics and the Institutions of the European Community,
in EuROPOLrrlcs, supra note 5, at 75.
21. See Id. at 78-84; NEILL NUGENT, THE GoVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMuNITY 376 (2d ed. 1991).
22. See, e.g., Laursen, supra note 5, at 250 ("The Community claims to be democratic...
[y]et, how democratic is it to be run by a non-elected Commission and a Council that meets in
camera?").
23. EC TREATY art. 158.
24. See Peters, supra note 20, at 98-100.
25. EC TREATY art. 144.
26. JOHN PINDER, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE BUILDING OF A UNION 36-37 (1991)
(addressing the relationship between the European Parliament and the Commission).
27. Weiler, supra note 5, at 2423-30.
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behind closed doors. Many note that this process, which can result
in Union action binding on the member states, decreases the
accountability of national executives to their parliaments. 29
Other forces further constrain oversight by national parliaments.
The detailed workings of the EU are frequently arcane and confusing,
the government of the day often limits the issues on which the
national parliament is consulted, and when the parliament is consulted
it is usually after the most basic decisions have already been made.
Even when ministers do report back to parliament, it is all too easy
to blame unpopular aspects of a decision on obstinate partners; no
one actor is accountable for the final product as a whole." Further-
more, the process disrupts established national channels of lobbying
and influence. Only the best organized national groups can have an
effective voice in EU decision making.31
In keeping with the structural focus of their critiques, most
observers of the Union argue that the solution to the EU's problems
of democratic legitimacy is to shift the balance of power among the
Union's institutions.32 If the Commission is completely unaccount-
able to democratic bodies and the Council that has evolved to check
it is imperfectly so, the obvious remedy is to strengthen the European
Parliament as a check on the Council.33 The European Parliament
is now directly elected (before 1979, national parliaments delegated
members to it),34 and it thus seems to be the one EU institution with
impeccable democratic credentials. If it is given powers of co-decision
with the Council on new legislation and if the Commission is made
accountable to it, the problems highlighted by the above-mentioned
criticisms could be solved. A democratic institution would be
intimately involved with all phases of EU action.
28. See Laursen, supra note 5, at 250; Williams, supra note 5, at 163.
29. NUGENT, supra note 21, at 371; Williams, supra note 5, at 158-60; see Juliet Lodge, EC
Policymaking, Institutional Considerations, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE
CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE 31-32 (Juliet Lodge ed., 1989);
30. See PINDER, supra note 26, at 38-39.
31. See Lodge, supra note 29, at 51-54; Weiler, supra note 5, at 2453-54.
32. BURGESS, supra note 12, at 93-101; Laursen, supra note 5, at 250; James O'Connell, The
Making of Europe: Strengths, Constraints, and Resolutions, in A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE
23,36-37 (Preston King & Andrea Bosco eds., 1991); see NUGENT, supra note 21, at 164-65,300-
12.
33. See Williams, supra note 5, at 167-69.
34. Juliet Lodge, The European Parliament-From 'Assembly' to Co-Legislature: Changing
the Institutional Dynamics, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE
FUTURE, supra note 29, at 58, 60; NUGENT, supra note 21, at 142.
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In short, in the eyes of many scholars a strong European
Parliament means a democratic European Union, and the source of
the EU's current problems is simply the European Parliament's
weakness. Lest the point appear overstated, the democratic deficit is
commonly defined in terms such as "the gap between the powers
transferred to the Community level and the control of the elected
Parliament over them."35 Thus, the question of democratic account-
ability is easily answered by shifting power among the already-existing
parts of the EU machine; all that is required is another step in the
incremental process of institutional development that has carried the
Union to this point. This is the "technocratic" view; it proposes
expert institutional redesign as the solution to the problem of the
EU's exclusion of the peoples of Europe.
B. A Critique, or, Technocracy Is Not Democracy
There are serious problems with the mainstream analysis of and
prescription for the democratic deficit. There is no doubt that the
changes prescribed would be worthwhile and would lead to a Union
that is somewhat more democratic. However, they would not be
nearly as effective as their proponents think, and the democratic
deficit would continue to yawn wide even if the contemplated changes
were fully enacted.
The difficulty is that there is something more afoot than a break
in the chain of democratic control. Indeed, there is no gap in the
formal democratic accountability of the Council of the European
Union. The ministers are, after all, members of the freely elected
national governments of the day acting within their legal authority,
and they remain individually accountable to their governments for
their actions.36 Furthermore, they are acting within the confines of
European institutions that have been duly approved by national
democratic processes. Though the national parliaments may face
some tactical obstacles in overseeing EU actions, they certainly retain
the power to force a more accountable pattern of decision making
35. Williams, supra note 5, at 162; see also ERNESr WISTRICH, AFTER 1992: THE UNITED
STATES OF EUROPE 102 (1991); Peters, supra note 20, at 90; cf. Weiler, Supra note 5, at 2466
(noting the prevalence of such definitions).
36. See Williams, supra note 5, at 158-60 (discussing the relationship between ministers and
national parliaments).
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through their control over national affairs;37 in fact, the Danish
Folketing has been quite successful in doing exactly that.38
This is not to say that the link between the people and EU
decisions has not become attenuated in Union institutions; it has."
It is possible to criticize European decision making on those grounds
even while recognizing that formal accountability still exists." It
bears noting, though, that the attenuation of parliamentary control
involved in the EU's operations is not very different from the realities
of modem national political life. Similar criticisms-that citizens'
access to government has been reduced and many governmental
actors are no longer clearly accountable to the electorate for their
actions-can and have been made about the modem administrative
state in general.41 However, there is not the same widespread sense
of democratic crisis surrounding the bureaucracies of Paris as one
finds in Brussels. The differences in the structure of democratic
control alone are not great enough to account for the profound
difference in perceived democratic legitimacy.
If the European Union's democratic deficit is not solely the
product of institutional features, reform strategies that only change
the institutions are unlikely to be effective. A deeper transformation
of the European polity is needed, but first we must obtain a clearer
view of the problems to be addressed.
III. THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY EXPLORED
Joseph Weiler's distinction between formal and social legitimacy
provides a useful beginning in unearthing the roots of Europe's demo-
cratic deficit. Weiler defines formal legitimacy as "legality understood
in the sense that democratic institutions and processes created the law
37. Techniques of control can include questioning ministers, withholding approval of
government measures, or altering national legal requirements. France and Germany have
recently amended their constitutions to increase parliamentary control over EC policy, but it is
too soon to tell how well the modifications will work in practice. FR. CONST. ART. 88-4; GER.
CONST. ART 23.
38. NUGENT, supra note 21, at 375; Laursen, supra note 19, at 66-67.
39. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
40. Alberta M. Sbragia, Thinking About the European Future: The Uses of Comparison,
in EUROpOLTICS, supra note 5, at 257, 277-78.
41. See, eg., Irving L. Horowitz, The Norm of llegitimacy- Ten Years Later, in LEGITIMA-
TION OF REGIMES 23, 25 (Bogdan Denitch ed., 1979) ("In Western capitalism and democracy,
those societies most characterized by parliamentary representation, the problem has been that
within a mass society there has been a stretching out effect of representational government.").
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on which [an institution] is based."'42 One might add a requirement
that the new entity remain, at least technically, subject to the ultimate
control of democratic institutions. Social legitimacy, by contrast,
"connotes a broad, empirically determined societal acceptance of the
system.
' 43
Weiler's distinction echoes throughout the literature on political
legitimacy. For these purposes, the literature may be grouped into
two broad categories: political philosophy and political science.
Political philosophy often concerns itself with questions of formal le-
gitimacy, trying to describe the ideal political system against which the
existing structures should be judged. Political science, on the other
hand, focuses almost exclusively on social legitimacy by asking
whether in fact the citizens of a society accept the social order as
basically just.
The currently dominant emphasis on the EU's formal structure
is consonant with the concerns of political philosophy. The search for
formal normative principles as the source and sign of state legitimacy
can be traced back to Rousseau,4 and it remains a strong current in
democratic theory today.' The hallmark of this approach is a
concern with constructing normative justifications for the state's exer-
cise of power. Thus, attempts to legitimate the EU by altering its
structure to more closely conform with norms of democratic account-
ability draw their inspiration from this vision of legitimacy.
Political science, on the other hand, provides a new perspective.
Seymour Lipset's definition of legitimacy is a classic example of
political science's emphasis on social legitimacy: "Legitimacy involves
the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that
the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the
society.'' 46 While Lipset's definition does not even hint at anything
but popular acceptance as a mark of legitimacy, the literature did not
at first clearly distinguish between political and social legitimacy; one
42. Weiler, supra note 5, at 2469.
43. Id For a similar classification system, see DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGrrIIMATION OF
POWER 4-16 (1991).
44. J.G. MERQUIOR, ROUSSEAU AND WEBER: TWO STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF
LEGITIMACY 9, 57 (1980).
45. See LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORrrY OF THE STATE 63-91 (1988) (noting political
theory's concern with normative justification); Bernard Manin, On Legitimacy and Political
Deliberation, 15 POL. THEORY 338, 352-59 (Lily Stein & Jayne Mansbridge trans., 1987)
(grounding legitimacy in open social deliberation, as opposed to Rousseau's constructive grant
of unanimous consent).
46. SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLTICS 64 (1981).
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was thought to produce the other in the modem state. Following
Weber, political scientists tended to find the legitimating basis of the
modem state in rational justifications of the political order.' Later
theorists, however, emphasized and distinguished the purely subjective
elements of legitimacy, reducing rationality to one element of the
equation. John Schaar's emphasis on the continuing importance of
myth, ritual, and citizen participation in the discursive construction of
social identity is typical of this trend.'
The content and rationality of the social order remain constituent
elements of legitimacy for political scientists. Most important is
JEirgen Habermas's argument that a "legitimation crisis" in modern
capitalist states can arise if a state's need to legitimate social and
economic intervention outstrips the capacity of the dominant
individualist ideology to support it.49  However, even though
Habermas believes that claims of legitimacy may theoretically be
constructed so as to allow rational testing-a "truth" independent of
psychology-in the end he is still interested in explaining the
subjective reactions of citizens to the state."
While these theorists were concerned with the legitimacy of
nation-states, their focus on subjective factors transfers well to multi-
national entities. One need look no further than the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) to see that acceptance is more important than formal
lines of authority. The ECJ's nominal powers are limited. Member
states or the Commission can bring suit for a violation of treaty
obligations, and there are other narrow categories of jurisdiction over
direct actions, but the Court has no effective means of enforce-
ment." However, the ECJ has been able to persuade national courts
47. See, eg., Max Weber, Legitimacy, Politics and the State, in LEGITIMACY AND THE
STATE, 32-34 (William Connally ed., 1984) It should be noted that Weber saw legitimacy strictly
as a social phenomenon not always produced by rational justification resembling formal le-
gitimacy; it was only in the modem state that he saw rationality as the dominant legitimating
tool. Id. at 32-33. See also JOHN H. SCHAAR, LEGITIMACY IN THE MODERN STATE 19-22 (1981)
(noting a gradual shift from the strictly formal concerns of political philosophy to the empirical
approach of modem political science).
48. SCHAAR, supra note 47, at 15, 37-42. See also BtETHAM, supra note 43, at 4-18 (distin-
guishing between formal and subjective elements of legitimacy).
49. JIlrgen Habermas, What Does a Crisis Mean Today? Legitimation Problems in Late
Capitalism, 40 Soc. RES. 643 (1973).
50. See JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGTIMATION CRISIS 95-110 (1975) (arguing that perceived
legitimacy can be explained and tested by reference to accepted conceptions of moral
legitimacy).
51. EC TREATY art. 169, 170, 164-88; Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in
EUROPOLITICS, supra note 5, at 123, 124-26. See generally NUGENT, supra note 21, at 178-87
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to refer cases to it and give force to its judgements. 2 The ECJ is
effective because it is respected by (and respectful of) the national
courts, not because of its nominal power. 3
Similarly, the Single European Act had an influence out of
proportion to its formal effects. The impact of the 1992 initiative was
much more a result of its influence on expectations and attitudes than
of the institutional and ideological changes it wrought. 4 Additional
support for the importance of perception in international interactions
can be found in an important branch of international relations theory
emphasizing the significance of cognitive factors in building a stable
community among a group of states.55
The political science literature suggests a serious flaw in the
current debate on democratic reform in the EU. Reform proposals
focusing exclusively on the balance of authority between existing EU
institutions only address the formal legitimacy of EU institutions, as
expressed by chains of democratic accountability.56  It seems clear,
though, that EU reformers are more concerned with real political
results than abstract forms of governance. If so, social legitimacy is
not just another issue to be considered. It is the most important issue.
In looking only at technical democratic accountability, those trying to
fill the democratic deficit have confused means and ends; formal
structure helps to engender social legitimacy, but it is not the same
thing. For instance, the key to understanding the different reaction
to a lack of formal accountability in the French bureaucracy, as
compared with the European Union, is social legitimacy: a wide-
spread sense that the political institution is an appropriate and
(describing the powers of the ECJ).
52. G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, in THE NEW EC, supra
note 2, at 177, 184-85.
53. Id. See also Weiler, supra note 5, at 2420-22.
54. See Hans Kastendiek, Convergence or a Persistent Diversity of National Politics?, in THE
POLITICS OF 1992: BEYOND THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 68,83 (Colin Crouch & David
Marquand eds., 1990).
55. See, e.g., BARRY BUZAN, PEOPLE, STATES, AND FEAR: THE NATIONAL SECURITY
PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1983) (arguing that concepts of community and
security deserve greater emphasis in the study of international relations); KARL W. DEUTSCH
ET AL., POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA (1957) (describing the
phenomenon of "security-communities" wherein the societies have attained a notion of
"community" such that the prevailing mood reveals a strong expectation of the peaceful
resolution of problems). But see JOSEPH M. GRIECO, COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS:
EUROPE, AMERICA, AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE (1990) (arguing in the "neorealist"
tradition that international cooperation is governed above all by mutual rivalries and the
distribution of power).
56. See supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
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integral part of the accepted social order. The ideal forms of direct
democratic control do not exist in practice in the modem state. A
sense of social legitimacy makes up for any gaps in the formal chains
of accountability when the system falls short of the unattainable
democratic ideal.
When proposals to narrow the democratic deficit are evaluated
against the need for a public sense that EU institutions and actions
deserve respect and acceptance, the weaknesses of a reform strategy
focusing on the European Parliament become apparent. The
European Parliament as an institution, while formally more democrat-
ic than the other Union organs, does not have enough prestige and
respect among ordinary European citizens to single-handedly bridge
the Union's democratic deficit. More importantly, available evidence
indicates that vesting greater power in the European Parliament is
unlikely to increase its stature enough to allow it to play the role of
the great legitimator.
The European Parliament's public image at the moment (to the
extent it has one) is wholly unenviable. A blunt but accurate assess-
ment of the general perception of the European Parliament is that it
is a "'yuppy' tourist club or 'gravy train"' which is "relatively
unknown and widely misunderstood" by the public at large.58 This
image has been reinforced by the national parties' tendency to use
European Parliament seats as sinecures or convenient places for
inconvenient people.59 Interest in the European Parliament and
awareness of its work remain quite low, despite the attempt to engage
public interest and participation with the move to direct elections in
1979. 60 Furthermore, European elections have done little to boost
the sense of a European polity. Elections have turned almost exclu-
sively on national political issues. 6' More surprisingly, even many of
57. See Joseph Rothschild, Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Europe, in LEGITIMATION
OF REGIMES, supra note 41, at 37, 39-40. See also BEETHAM, supra note 43, at 33 (noting that
legitimacy is needed to enable governments to withstand shocks and failures).
58. Lodge, supra note 34, at 58-59, 61.
59. Williams, supra note 5, at 169.
60. MILES HEwsToNE, UNDERSTANDING ATTITUDES TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A
SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY IN FOUR MEMBER STATES 36 (1986) (collecting and analyzing
public opinion data and concluding that Europeans are generally neither informed about nor
interested in the European Parliament).
61. HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 146-47; DEREK W. URWIN, WESTERN EUROPE SINCE 1945:
A POLITICAL HISTORY 368 (4th ed. 1989). This fact remains true even when the European
Parliament undertakes relatively high-profile initiatives for major reforms in the Community,
such as the Draft Treaty on European Union. Id. at 379-80.
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the referenda held on specific European issues have not significantly
increased public interest, but have been resolved on the basis of the
national politics of the day.62
One could argue, of course, that the low level of interest in
European Parliament elections is perfectly rational given the
Parliament's relative insignificance in the Union's present governing
process.63 Perhaps a more powerful European Parliament would
attract more interest and better-known candidates. Recent history,
though, gives reason to doubt this optimistic assessment. First, even
the referenda which directly determined national policy towards the
EU have not focused much attention on European issues.' Second,
the recent gains in the European Parliament's power have not been
accompanied by a rise in public interest in that institution. The Single
European Act significantly increased the European Parliament's
consultative role in the formation of legislation, gave it the power to
assent to or reject all new trade or cooperation agreements, and
added the requirement of European Parliamentary consent to the
accession of any new country to the Union.65 These powers were
modest, but came packaged with the high-profile 1992 project and the
accompanying sharp rise in interest and expectations regarding the
EU as a whole. The electoral result? Turnout at the 1989 European
Parliament elections declined significantly to an average of 58.4
percent, quite low by European standards.66
Such evidence as exists is not conclusive. It is possible that if the
EU shifted more power to the European Parliament, the Parliament
would become a more significant part of European life. Perhaps an
increase in the formal democratic legitimacy of the Union would even
make participation in European elections so much more significant for
the peoples of Europe that the entire enterprise would acquire the
widespread social legitimacy it seeks. But formal legitimacy is not the
same as social legitimacy; it is an instrument through which the
ultimate goal of social legitimacy may be attained. Furthermore,
while the available evidence does not absolutely rule out the
62. NUGENT, supra note 21, at 374 ("I]t is hard to sustain a case that [referenda] have
added very much to the democratic base of the Community: partly because of their infrequency,
and partly because at least three of them were not genuine attempts to consult the citizenry but
were the consequences of internal politicking.").
63. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
64. See supra text accompanying note 62.
65. Single European Act, supra note 2, arts. 7-9; Williams, supra note 5, at 164.
66. See HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 54; HENWsTONE, supra note 60, at 213.
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possibility of legitimating the EU through changes in the European
Parliament alone, neither does it provide any support for the
confident assertions of the proponents of such change.
IV. A NEW DIRECTION
It is nonetheless valid to ask why the adoption of the familiar
trappings of parliamentary democracy should not provide the social
legitimacy that would bridge the democratic deficit. It is obviously
not the nature of parliamentary systems in general that would leave
the reformed EU less legitimate than its constituent states. Implicit
so far in the discussion is the answer: the form of government at the
European level is not the cause of current problems. Rather, the
question of whether the European Union itself is an appropriate
polity by which the citizens of its member states can be governed is
the central issue. The challenge is not to reform the mechanisms by
which the people are governed, but to reconsider the boundaries of
political space.
Weiler recognizes that democratic theory alone cannot prescribe
the territorial limits of a legitimate government, the area within which
legitimate coercion by a majoritarian government can take place.67
Coercion is inevitable; no society is perfectly homogeneous, and every
power struggle has winners and losers. Social legitimacy, not formal
legitimacy, holds society together despite the imposition of one
group's will on another. Robert Dahl, on whom Weiler draws
heavily, provides an apt example:
The criteria of the democratic process presupposes the rightfulness
of the unit itself If the unit itself is not a proper or rightful unit,
then it cannot be made rightful simply by democratic procedures.
If the United States were to compel Costa Rica to become the
fifty-first state, would not Costa Ricans rightly feel-and we
too-that a grave injustice had been done?6'
Of course, in the European Union the change in political boundaries
is brought about by the consent of elected representatives rather than
by forcible conquest. The point, however, is that the question of the
legitimacy of the polity is prior to the question of the procedures by
67. Weiler, supra note 5, at 2471.
68. Robert A. Dahl, Federalism and the Democratic Process, in LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 95,
103-04 (NOMOS XXV, J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1983); see also LEA
BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL AcTS 55-55 (1989) (posing the hypothetical case of
one country annexing another and attempting to legitimate the act through an appeal to formal
democracy).
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which it constitutes itself and through which it acts. Normal represen-
tative principles fall short when a profound shift in the foundation of
the polity is considered.
Weiler also argues that a new federal democratic polity is initially
less legitimate than its constituent parts.69 As the polity becomes
larger, the ability of any particular group to influence policy is diluted.
It may at first seem odd to say that a political unit that is larger is
ipso facto less democratic than a smaller one; one does not think of
the German government as less democratic than that of Portugal
merely because Germany is seven or eight times larger and each
individual's influence is less in Germany. The ultimate legitimating
solution is the boundary shift outlined above-the constituent groups
of a new federal polity, formerly the highest arenas of political power,
must adjust to the idea that they can now be overridden by the other
groups.70 This adjustment is difficult and gradual. Political attach-
ments based on emotion rather than reason cannot be changed
overnight; much time and effort will be expended before the new
polity is accepted as the valid area within which majority rule applies.
The key to legitimacy is not formal democracy but a popular
acceptance of the system.
Given that the challenge is to bolster the social legitimacy of the
EU by bringing about a subjective redefinition of the polity, how can
that challenge be met?- Weiler's analysis stops here; he asserts only
that it is an "open question" whether the proper conditions for
popular acceptance of a redefined political boundary exist.7' Perhaps
an answer is implicit in his emphasis on the importance of the passage
of a transition period and his optimistic view of the 1992 initiative's
effects in mobilizing pro-Union opinion.'
It is doubtful that the success of projects like 1992 will eventually
build popular acceptance of the Union order based solely on the EU's
ability to advance people's material interests. It may be true that an
ineffective government will be unable to maintain social legitimacy,
but it does not follow that an efficient government will automatically
achieve legitimacy. As Joseph Rothschild argues, efficiency can never
fully substitute for legitimacy.73 No government is perfectly efficient
in achieving material goals, and whether the inevitable everyday
69. Weiler, supra note 5, at 2471.
70. Id. at 2470.
71. Id. at 2473-74.
72. Id. at 2471-72, 2480-83.
73. See Rothschild, supra note 57.
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frictions and imperfections of government are tolerated depends on
the independent social legitimacy of the government. 4 As with an
emphasis on formal structure, an exclusive focus on economic results
obscures the central issue of subjective political identity.
V. TRANSFORMING THE POLITY
Constitutionalism provides the best route for a self-conscious
redefinition of the European polity. Although the substance of a new
constitution for Europe does matter, the process of deliberate public
mobilization and political transformation inherent in constitution
making is more important than the content of the final document.
Constitutionalism is not used here to denote centralism, as
Euroskeptics often fear.75  Indeed, as will be seen below,
constitutionalism can serve to guard against overcentralization.
A. The Virtues of Constitutionalism
The development of the European Union has been gradual by
design. The neofunctionalists, long the dominant group among
integration theorists, argued that attempts to integrate Europe would
lead to "spillover" amongst related areas of concern and would inspire
self-interested pressure groups to demand greater integration in the
name of efficiency.76 Even after neofunctionalist theory was largely
abandoned,77 European institutions drawing on similar inspirations
have lived on.78
74. Id at 48-49.
75. Cf. Moravcsik, supra note 2, at 41,53 (discussing British conservatives' distrust of both
written constitutions and centralizing tendencies within the EC).
76. See generally ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE (1957) (outlining an early
version of neofunctionalism); LEON N. LINDBERG & STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, REGIONAL
INTEGRATION: THEORY AND RESEARCH (1971). Neofunctionalism is a branch of integration
theory focusing on the role of international institutions in promoting cooperative economic and
social problem-solving. The hope is that as international institutions prove their utility in solving
practical material problems, participants will be encouraged to address other, related problems
through joint action and will develop ties to the institution and each other that will cut across
national boundaries and cement peaceful political relationships. Id. at 6-8.
77. Ernst B. Haas, Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration, 30 INT'L ORG.
173 (1976), is generally read as neofunctionalism's eulogy. Haas methodically and comprehen-
sively showed that the core assumptions of these theories were "becoming less and less relevant
to the behavior patterns actually displayed by governments active in regional organizations."
Id.
78. See generally BURGESS, supra note 12, at 32-33 (describing the incrementalist design of
the EC).
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The underlying premise of the neofunctionalist approach, that
economic efficiency will necessarily create social legitimacy, is
mistaken.79 Furthermore, the gradualist approach poses special
dangers in today's world. A gradual buildup of ties between the
peoples and nations of Europe was certainly needed to lay the
groundwork for a radical transformation of the polity. Perhaps the
transformation could occur by itself over time. The problem is that
such a transformation is needed now. For reasons discussed below,
the EU is at a unique crossroads of opportunity and danger."0 The
existing concerns over the democratic deficit clearly indicate that the
realities of new European institutions have outstripped the capacity
of existing national-citizen paradigms to legitimate them. The crisis
of legitimacy is not something that will develop into an obstacle to
European development in the future; it is here now.
Bruce Ackerman's work with the United States Constitution
describes the way in which constitutionalism is capable of sparking the
decisive paradigm shift and bringing about a transformation of the
polity. Ackerman analogizes constitution making with revolution.8'
Revolution is a political activity capable of breaking history in two:
the period before the revolution is different in kind from what comes
afterwards.' While revolutions are usually mounted by enemies of
the regime, Ackerman's idea can encompass a consensual revolution
as well. In a consensual revolution, the attachment to the new regime
born of long struggle and sacrifice present in violent revolutions
would be lost. However, the crucial element of revolution is that the
mobilized population thinks that there is an active revolution, that
their purpose is to reconstruct the political order with exceptional
seriousness and attention.83 Revolutionary legitimacy, though often
associated with a violent rebellion against the status quo, at core rests
on a claim that one is acting in the name of the people, in the
people's interest, and outside the normal channels of government.'
Once the revolution declares itself a success, a constitution can serve
to solidify and enshrine the changes it has produced. Ackerman's
79. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
80. See discussion infra part IV C.
81. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 204-212 [hereinafter FOUNDA-
TIONS]. Ackerman builds upon Hannah Arendt's description of revolution as both a break with,
and a reinterpretation of, the past. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963).
82. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 81, at 204-06.
83. Id. at 203-04; BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 5-6 (1992)
[hereinafter LIBERAL REVOLUTION].
84. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 81, at 170-72.
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model, naturally, is the United States Constitution, which was the
revolutionaries' attempt "to give self-conscious structure to the great
public stage they had built for themselves."'
Ackerman's concept of "higher lawmaking"86 is also relevant.
It consists of four phases: signaling entry into the constitutional pro-
cess, proposing changes, mobilizing popular deliberation, and
codifying the law.' Higher lawmaking takes place within an existing
system, and lacks the Sturm und Drang of full-scale revolution to
capture popular attention. However, the procedure of constitutional
debate itself sets off enough signals of political importance to increase
the salience of the issues for the people as a whole and to engage
them in the debate.'
Any transformation of the EU would not fit neatly into either the
revolutionary or higher lawmaking pattern. The changes that would
legitimate a pan-European polity are neither within the boundaries of
the current system nor wholly destructive of it.89  Whatever the
hybrid constructed, however, the key point is the same. The way to
transform political identity is to take center stage in the public arena
and loudly announce that the question of political self-definition is
open for debate. Constitution making is an easily recognized
statement of such a purpose in Western states. The process of
creating a constitution with mass participation clarifies and focuses de-
bate on the issues, leaves evidence of what was agreed upon, and is
in the end legitimated by the process that went into making it.
B. Treaties Cannot Substitute for a Constitution
The treaties establishing and modifying the EU, ° together with
the associated ECJ jurisprudence, are not a substitute for a constitu-
tion. While the existing body of law serves some of the same defining
85. Id. at 206.
86. Id. at 266.
87. Id. at 266-67.
88. Id. at 285-87.
89. While any new European system would, necessarily, be rooted in the EC experience,
the creation of a constitution for one European polity is outside the treaty paradigm of an
agreement between separate polities. See discussion infra part IV D (considering proposals for
changing the EU).
90. The most significant treaties are the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL
AND STEEL COMMUNITY [ECSC TREATY], the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC
ENERGY COMMUNITY [EURATOM TREATY], the EC TREATY, the Single European Act, and the
EU TREATY.
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and governing purposes as a constitution would, it is not now and will
not become capable of serving the necessary legitimating functions.
There are several substantive weaknesses in the existing
treaties.91 First, as treaties, they are addressed exclusively to states,
not to citizens. There is no detailed concern in the treaties with
individual fights or civil libertiesO2 The ECJ's vague promise that it
will restrain arbitrary government93 is a poor substitute for real
concern about the individual's relation to European authority. 4
Second, the treaties do not adequately serve a constitution's
function of constraining political power. Because of their setting in
international law, the treaties' language is all enabling, not restrictive.
The international law paradigm begins with a presumption of the
autonomy of the sovereign state, and unless one can point to a source
of authority limiting state action it is not constrained. 5 The focus on
enablement allows a virtually unlimited use of the treaties' language
to expand EU competence, with little or no language that can be cited
as a countervailing limiting principle. The first step towards address-
ing this imbalance explicitly is the insertion of the "subsidiarity"
principle in the Maastricht treaty.' However, this principle, which
in theory limits the Union to performing those functions that cannot
adequately be performed by member states, has been criticized as
"weak, subjective, and open-ended."' The growing reality of action
without unanimous consent of the member states, either by majority
vote of the Council of Ministers or the independent action of the ECJ
or Commission, makes the lack of any clear limits on the expansion
of EU power troubling and strengthens the hands of those seeking to
91. For similar critiques of the treaty-based paradigm, see Mancini, supra note 52, at 178;
Frank Vibert, Europe's Constitutional Deficit, in JAMES M. BUCHANAN ET AL., EUROPE'S
CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE 69, 87 (1990).
92. Indeed, there was none at all until the Maastricht treaty. EU TREATY art. F ("The
Union shall respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ....").
93. See, e.g., Case 473, J. Nold KG v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 491, 14 C.M.L.R. 338
(1974) (looking to international treaties and member state constitutions as sources of individual
rights in EC law); Case 11170, Internationale Handelgesellschaft v. Einfuhr-und-Vorratsstelle
Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 11 C.M.L.R. 255 (1972) (recognizing that
protection of fundamental individual rights is implicit in EC law).
94. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1103, 1105 (1986).
95. See S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A) No. 10; see also Eric Stein,
External Relations of the European Community, in 1 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY
OF EUROPEAN LAW 115, 132 (1991) (noting this feature in EC law).
96. EU TREATY, art. G(5).
97. See Vibert, supra note 91, at 80; HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 184.
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erode support for the EU by warning of a virtual dictatorship of the
Brussels bureaucrats.98 Whatever one thinks the final structure and
limit of EU power should be, the failure to clearly delineate those
powers erodes the EU's legitimacy.
The current substantive defects in the treaties are perhaps
remediable by amendment, but there are other inescapable features
of treaties in general that substantially undercut the quest for social
legitimacy. Treaties necessarily fuel the elitist tendencies of the
Union.99 They are negotiated by national executives in highly
technical, closed-door bargaining."° Word of the course of negotia-
tions gets out, but news leaks are hardly interchangeable with mass
political participation. 1 Nor do treaties have the same inspirational
potential as constitutions. Treaties do not carry a sense of unique
importance, an earnest declaration of the purposes and aspirations of
a people. Neither do they go out of their way to provoke a thought-
ful debate or consensus on the key features of the new polity. To
return to the subject of legitimacy, the key to socially legitimate au-
thority is to help the individual answer these questions: "Who am I
as an individual? Who am I as a member of this society? Who am
I as a mortal member of humanity?"'" The dense, dry language
dominating the EU treaties is of no more help in answering these
questions than is the telephone book.
Although constitutions have major advantages over treaties as
vehicles for real change, as a practical matter constitutionalism must
overcome Euroskeptical biases. Constitutionalism has a bad name
among those who seek to limit the further growth of the Union,
probably because the word calls forth associations with a desire for a
strong, centralized EU authority at the expense of state sovereign-
ty. 3 Although the need for social legitimacy will be even greater
if the EU grows significantly in power-and such growth is more
likely than not-constitutionalism is primarily a means of legitimating
and defining the European order, regardless of what its content may
98. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text; see also Weiler, supra note 5, at 2450-53.
99. Sbragia, supra note 40, at 273-74.
100. See PINDER, supra note 26, at 201.
101. See Williams, supra note 5, at 173, 175 (stressing the lack of public participation and
leadership accountability within the EU today).
102. SCHAAR, supra note 47, at 40.
103. PINDER, supra note 26, at 3. For other works that view constitutionalism similarly see
O'Connell, supra note 32; Charles Grant, An Expanding Universe: Time for a New Constitution,
ECONOMIsT, July 7,1990, at 29; A CONSTrUmON FOR EUROPE, supra note 32 (collecting essays
by pro-expansion authors favoring constitutionalism).
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be. A stronger social base would benefit the Union as it exists today,
and in any case would serve to cement whatever European accord
emerges. For that reason, some who strongly oppose centralization
support constitutionalism, on the theory that only a well-defined,
consensually legitimate crystallization of the political order can halt
the expansion driven by European institutions."4
The fate of Canada's constitutional referendum provides an
instructive cautionary tale. Though not technically a treaty, the
constitutional proposal shared the relevant features of the treaties
discussed above. It was negotiated by the provincial and national
executives in physical and symbolic seclusion from the rest of the
society, then presented to the people as a conclusive agreement. 5
The tone and style of the proposal were, to say the least, not
calculated to set hearts racing in Saskatoon. When the referendum
came the proposal was soundly rejected."l Two common explana-
tions for the failure of the referendum were that the people simply
did not feel they understood the proposal sufficiently, and that they
did not see why it was important to make changes at that time. 0 7
The elected leaders of the provinces had agreed after a long and
difficult debate on the best way to reform the Canadian political
order; they failed because they left the people out of the process.
C. Opportunity and Crisis
Several forces have converged to ensure that Europe can and
must seize the moment for constitutional reform. Essentially, they
break down into two categories: internal dynamics and external
change. Internally, the Habermas-like tension between the functional-
interventionist need for the legitimacy of an expanding EU and the
104. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, Europe's Constitutional Opportunity, in EUROPE'S CON-
STITUTIONAL FUTURE, supra note 91, at 1; Vibert, supra note 91 (arguing for constitutional
limitations on EC power).
105. See Alan C. Cairns, Citizens and Their Charter: Democratizing the Process of Consti-
tutional Reform, in THE MEECH LAKE PRIMER 109 (Michael D. Behiels ed., 1989); Richard
Simeon, Political Pragmatism Takes Precedence over Democratic Process, in id. at 125; Jennifer
Smith, Representation and Constitutional Reform in Canada, in AFTER MEECH LAKE: LESSONS
FOR THE FUTURE 69 (David E. Smith et al. eds., 1991).
106. Carol Goar, Canadians Do Find Unity - In Rejecting Leaders' Vision, TORONTO STAR,
Oct. 27, 1992, at Al.
107. See, e.g., George Bain, Education is a Two-Way Street, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 2,1992, at 52
(highlighting the Canadian public's feeling that the government failed to educate them on the
referendum); Mark Clayton, Behind 'English' Canada's Rejection of Unity Pact, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 4, 1992, at 3 (describing the post-vote sentiment that the need for change had
not been adequately explained).
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limits of the underlying ideology has been building for years. Talk of
the democratic deficit is not a recent phenomenon.' °s However, it
gained some urgency with the relaunch of the EU in the Single
European Act, an action inspired by: juridical evolution; political and
economic reaction to the "Eurosclerosis" of sluggish economic growth,
inflation, and political drift in the 1970s; and adroit institutional
maneuvering within the EU.' 9 The symbolic success of the 1992
initiative brought questions of EU identity forward on the agenda and
raised their importance to the public at large.
The development of public opinion in the EU has also reached
a stage where mobilization and redefinition are possible. There is
widespread public support for the Union and for pan-European
ideals."0 The support is unfocused and thin, more a vague emotion-
al sense than a carefully developed position."' However, it does
suggest that the citizens of EU member states may well be prepared
for precisely the sort of persuasion and intellectual solidification that
constitutional debate would bring to their generally positive feelings
towards Europe.
Recent changes in Europe are also highly conducive to transfor-
mation of the EU order. The revolutions of 1989 and the end of the
cold war have destroyed the old external order and forced the EU to
redefine its position, whether it wants to or not. The vacuum of
power and political organization left by the end of the superpower
confrontation will inevitably be filled. There is thus a unique
opportunity to seize the moment of transition and consciously guide
it in the desired direction."2 The internal and external develop-
ments are mutually reinforcing: the EU is a natural candidate to step
into the breach because of its recent activism. Most importantly, the
108. See, e.g., P.D. DASTOGLOU, BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 81-83
(1975); DAvID MARQUAND, PARLIAMENT FOR EUROPE 64-66, 87-90 (1979); Karl Bracher,
Democracy, in EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: VISION AND REALITY 99 (James Barber & Bruce
Reed eds., 1973). See generally URWIN, supra note 12, at 166-70 (outlining early pressures for
democratization).
109. See generally David R. Cameron, The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences, in
EUROPOLITICS, supra note 5, at 23 (tracing the convergence of forces leading to the 1992
initiative). See also Keohane and Hoffmann, supra note 11, at 23-25 (finding the roots of the
initiative in national adjustments of political and economic policy).
110. See Jim Campbell et al., Implementing the Internal Market, in THE POLITICS OF 1992,
supra note 54, at 138.
111. See HEWSTONE, supra note 60, at 206; HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 150-52.
112. LIBERAL REVOLUTION, supra note 83, at 36-38.
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task of institutional reform has been made much more urgent by the
sudden disappearance of the prior order."'
These current opportunities are paired with clear risks. The
internal opportunity for reform is imperiled by the uneasiness with the
new EU, as epitomized by the crises arising out of the Maastricht
reforms." 4 Development seems in danger of stalling, and prior agree-
ments could fall apart. The external opportunity is paired with even
more obvious risks: a failure to consolidate the EU as the anchor of
a new European order threatens a slide into a new pan-European
disorder with unforeseeable consequences. The benefits of acting
now, and the costs of failing to do so, counsel immediate action. It
is clear the Europe will change. The only question is whether the
change will be conscious or merely a random drift.
D. Some Substantive Suggestions
The aforementioned prescriptions could be criticized as all
process and no content, and in a sense such criticism would be
accurate. The legitimating experience of debating and defining the
European political order is more important than the precise contours
of whatever substantive decisions are made by Europeans. The EU
project needs to be placed upon much firmer political and social
footing to avoid the risk of falling apart. While the argument of this
Article is that Europeans must come together and choose their own
path, certain political ideas and institutions seem especially well-suited
to their needs.
First and most important among these is federalism. "Aha," cries
the Euroskeptic, "we suspected all along that your secret agenda was
a United States of Europe ruled by a paper fist from Brussels!" Not
at all. As was the case with constitutionalism, federalism is an idea
unjustly set up as a threat by those who oppose further centraliza-
tion."' Federalist ideas provide important principles to ensure a
legitimate and stable European polity, regardless of the range of the
EU's authority. The conflation of federalism with centralism in non-
academic (and sometimes academic) European rhetoric obscures its
true function." 6 In fact, federalism already exists to some degree
113. Laursen, supra note 3, at 240-41 (discussing the EC's actions in relation to the recent
external and internal political changes in Europe).
114. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
115. BURGESS, supra note 12, at 15. -
116. In Britain, for example, federalism is treated as virtually synonymous with centralism.
See, e.g., Not Quite Pulling Together, ECONOMIST, Nov. 23, 1991, at 63 (quoting former Prime
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in the EU it like many authors, one accepts as its core notion a more
or less permanent division of competences between levels of govern-
ment."7 For example, the competence to conclude international
agreements is clearly divided between the EU and the member states
in a federalist manner; some functions are left to the states, while
others are reserved to the Union alone."8 The important thing to
keep in mind is that federalism operates to exclude issues from the
competence of the larger unit as well as to include them. Far from
being a road to a unitary state, federalism is an alternative to it that
seeks to establish a stable division of power that should "no longer be
viewed as a new unitary state in the making but rather as something
distinctive in its own right.""M9
Aside from stabilizing and defining the European order,
federalism has normative contributions to make to the EU. Choosing
federal rather than unitary arrangements respects and incorporates
cleavages between the constituent units.12 One of the key integra-
tive maneuvers in the prelude to the 1992 initiative was the decision
to address interstate regulatory differences through a validation of
national standards rather than through harmonization and the
elimination of national differences.'2' The change is emblematic of
a federalist philosophy that attempts to accommodate difference, not
obliterate it. As Weiler argues, such a federalism of cross-national
and cross-cultural tolerance is one of the most important contributions
the EU can make to the development of international relations."
The drive towards decentralization in many European states,
including Belgium, Spain, and even France, appears at first glance to
Minister Thatcher attacking Maastricht as a "conveyor-belt to federalism").
117. Dahl, supra note 68, at 95-96; HOLLAND, supra note 5, at 56.
118. Generally, the EC has competence to make treaties on the subjects entrusted to it (e.g.
tariffs), while member states retain treaty-making authority in other areas (e.g. foreign policy).
EC TREATY arts. 113,229-31,238; Case 27/70, ERTA, 1971 E.C.R. 263,10 C.M.L.R. 335 (1971)
(extending treaty-making power to any internal competence). This division of authority has led
to the "mixed agreement" treaties, which both the EC and its member states sign in order to
address issues failing within the authority of each. P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLAUEN VAN
THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 773-76 (2d ed.
1989). Though conflicts arise over the precise division of treaty-making authority between the
states and the Community, see Stein, supra note 95, at 115-32, the point remains that there is an
explicit division and allocation of powers between the two levels of authority.
119. BURGESS, supra note 12, at 18.
120. Buchanan, supra note 104, at 2; Sbragia, supra note 40, at 279-80.
121. Kastendiek, supra note 54, at 78-79. Mutual recognition of national standards was one
of the central innovations of the 1985 White Paper launching the 1992 initiative. White Paper,
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DEFICIT REDUCTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
be in tension with the construction of a new, even larger European
polity." If federalism is properly understood, though, the paradox
is resolved. European views of federalism emphasize subsidiarity, a
concept with varying definitions but essentially reducible to the
proposition that governmental functions should be allocated to the
smallest unit capable of carrying them out effectively.24 Whether
or not subsidiarity would provide a justiciable limiting principle for
EU actions, it at least provides intellectual coherence to a redistribu-
tion of power from the nation-state that flows both up and down.
Some functions, such as defense and macroeconomic policy, may be
better performed on a higher level, whereas others, such as education,
could be best served by control on the local or regional level.
Subsidiarity in the EU's context carries within it hints of the
demise of the European state. The argument could easily be made
that most important governmental functions are best performed either
on as large a scale as possible, to maximize the advantages of size, or
on as small a scale as possible, to maximize local control. It is at least
true that subsidiarity does not serve well as the great defender of
national sovereignty, and that a federalist EU could pose especially
strong threats to federalist states with strong internal cleavages.
Still, the idea of a "Europe of the regions" is best left aside for
the moment. As a practical matter, the European state system is too
entrenched to challenge directly. This is not only true in terms of
formal political power, which could perhaps be overcome by a
constitutional mobilization, but in terms of the values of the peoples
of Europe." National identities, while not all-powerful, are still an
important part of the European political persona, and it is ahistorical
to think that they will disappear instantly. It is so unlikely that
Europeans would be willing to abandon their national identities for
local and European ties (that is, after all, the issue on which many of
the current worries about legitimacy center) that any attempt to
incorporate such a move in the short-run transformation of the
European polity is likely to derail the entire process. A Europe of
the regions is something that could develop in the future-but not
now.
123. See generally FEDERALISM AND FEDERATION IN WESTERN EUROPE (Michael Burgess,
ed., 1986) (analyzing national trends).
124. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
125. Cameron, supra note 109, at 73-74; Sbragia, supra note 40, at 274-75.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The European Union lacks sufficient democratic legitimacy in the
eyes of many who live within it. Moreover, the proposals that domi-
nate the reform debate will not resolve the problem. They focus on
the mechanisms through which the EU acts rather than on the legiti-
mate reach of its power to act at all. What is needed is a politics of
mobilization and consensus around the shape of the European order,
whatever it will be, to reach agreement on the game as well as the
rules. Constitutionalism provides an arena for Europeans to engage
in considered aspiration and self-definition. The point is not legalism
for its own sake, but producing what will truly be a "people's
Europe"-not because the leaders tried to protect the people's inter-
est, but because the people built it themselves.
